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Enforcing a Unitary Patent in
Europe: What the U.S. Federal Courts and
Community Design Courts Teach Us
PHILIP P. SOO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Document Security Systems (“DSS”), a company in Rochester,
New York, provides advanced anti-counterfeiting technologies to
corporations, banks, and governments worldwide.1 One of its
proprietary technologies is a method of making a document cleverly
induce a moiré pattern (i.e. optical interference pattern) when the
document is photocopied, thus making it immediately apparent that the
copy is a counterfeit.2 European Patent No. 0455750, granted in 1999,
eventually provided DSS patent rights to this method in thirteen
European countries.3 Upon discovering that the European Central Bank
(“ECB”) was using this anti-counterfeiting measure, DSS filed an
infringement suit in August 2005, claiming that the ECB manufactured
and distributed euro banknotes using its patented technology.4
The ECB would not go quietly, challenging the venue of the
lawsuit and arguing that each individual country where the ECB
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013; Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000; B.S.,
Cornell University, 1994. The author acknowledges Professor Karl Manheim, Professor Joseph
Straus, Stefan Wilhelm, Dean Harts, and Simon Klopschinski for their feedback and the Loyola
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review staff for their extraordinary attention
to detail in the publication process.
1. About DSS, DOC. SEC. SYS., http://www.dsssecure.com/about-dss (last visited June 30,
2012).
2. See EP Patent No. 0455750, ¶¶ 7–9 (filed Jan. 16, 1990).
3. Id. ¶ 1.
4. Case T-295/05, Document Sec. Sys. v. European Cent. Bank, 2007 E.C.R. II-2844, ¶¶
15–16, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005B0295:EN:HTML.
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operates must be sued on a nation-by-nation basis.5 In March 2006, the
ECB filed counterclaims in the United Kingdom and Luxembourg in
parallel actions, seeking to invalidate the patent on the basis that it
lacked novelty.6 Challenges to the validity of the patent, largely in the
same form, were subsequently served in the Netherlands, Germany,
Austria, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and France.7 The United Kingdom, a
forum with a recent reputation for being unfriendly to patent
proprietors,8 declared the DSS patent invalid for a different reason—that
the patent disclosure was insufficient to support the claims.9 Yet, just a
day later, the comparatively pro-patent Germany held that the same
patent was valid.10
Six years have gone by since the initial DSS lawsuit, and there is
still no agreement over the validity of European Patent No. 0455750.
Three jurisdictions—Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain—have
upheld the validity of the DSS patent.11 Courts of the United Kingdom,
Austria, Belgium, and France invalidated the patent, while the question
of invalidity in Italy is still pending.12 Who are the casualties in this
bewildering state of affairs? The primary losers are ostensibly the
litigants. Lawsuits are notoriously costly, with average litigation costs in
just four European countries totaling about €3.6 million ($4.6 million in
2012).13 The countries also suffer, since duplicative litigation results in a
substantial waste of judicial resources. Perhaps the greatest casualty of
all is the European patent system itself, since confusing and
contradictory rulings irreparably damage its credibility and standing
amongst present and future patent proprietors.14
This Note submits that a unitary patent right in Europe is ripe and
should be timely promulgated to incentivize innovation and investment
5. Id.
6. Id. at II-2844.
7. Id.
8. See Gary Moss & Robert Lundie Smith, Forum Shopping: Is the England and Wales
Patents Court Really a Non-Starter for Patentees?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 715 (2011),
available at http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/rls0711.pdf.
9. Document Sec. Sys., 2007 E.C.R. at II-2845.
10. See Moss & Smith, supra note 8, at 4 (acknowledging the preference for Germany and
the Netherlands as forums for litigation as a patentee).
11. Mary Stone, Court Rules Document Security Systems Patent Valid in Spain, ROCHESTER
BUS. J. (Mar. 24, 2010, 3:36 PM), available at http://www.rbj.net/print_article.asp?aID=183392.
12. Id.
13. Malwina Mejer & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Beyond the Prohibitive Cost
of Patent Protection in Europe, VOX (Apr. 10, 2009), http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3440.
14. Id.
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needed in the presently embattled European economy. Part II begins by
tracing the evolution of European patent rights, from the Paris
Convention to the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and most recently to the
European Patent Convention. From there, Part II reviews past efforts to
integrate these rights and the ultimate failure of these efforts to provide
multinational patent enforcement in Europe. Part III will then examine
both legal and practical issues confronting a unitary patent system,
emphasizing the challenges in harmonizing the European Patent
Convention with the governing European Union treaty for countries
bound by both agreements.
Part IV follows up this discussion with a comparison between two
existing approaches to achieving a unified patent court: one based on
the U.S. Federal Court system and the other based on European
Community design courts. While both approaches effectively enforce a
unitary right, the latter approach should inform the unitary patent
project.
Finally, Part V addresses specific criticisms leveled at the current
Patent Court agreement concerning, in particular, its legality and
practicability. First, under both the European Patent Convention and
governing EU treaties, the roles played by non-European Union
institutions, particularly the European Patent Organization and the
Patent Court, have an express legal basis. Second, the proposed
regulation and agreement rightfully empowers the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”) to check the Patent Court in matters of patent law. Part
V concludes by cautioning that the ECJ, if so empowered, should
emulate the judicial restraint of the U.S. Supreme Court in creating a
viable legal foundation for a unitary patent system.
II. EUROPEAN PATENT LAW REMAINS FRAGMENTED DESPITE GROWING
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AMONGST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
A. Historically, Territoriality Governed European Patent Rights
Patents are granted for useful inventions, including improvements,
which satisfy a minimal level of non-obviousness.15 A purpose of patent
law is to encourage innovation by providing an inventor a limited
monopoly whereby others can be excluded from marketing and

15. See W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS
§ 1-01 (4th ed. 1999).

AND ALLIED RIGHTS
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financially exploiting the invention.16 In exchange, the invention is fully
disclosed to the public, where the disclosure can spur further inventions,
ultimately benefitting society.17
Historically, patent rights followed the principle of territoriality:
each country created and enforced its own patent rights exclusively
within its jurisdiction.18 Following the Second World War, however, the
political and economic structure of Europe became transformed as
countries realized the potential benefits of integration.19 In 1957, talks
culminated in six European countries signing the Treaty of Rome,
which created the European Economic Community (“EEC”).20 The
Treaty of Rome sought, “by establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union . . . to promote throughout the
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth . . . a high degree of
convergence of economic performance . . . and economic and social
cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”21 In an effort to
promote further economic, social, judicial, and political cohesion, the
Treaty on European Union successively amended first the Treaty of
Rome, and then the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“Lisbon Treaty”).22 As will be discussed, the latter treaty further
reformed EU institutions and provided a new legal basis for EU-wide
intellectual property rights.

16. Daniel Hanrahan, Get Your Dirty Gray Market Goods Out of My Country —
Enforcement of Patent Rights in the EU, 18 DIGEST 1, 2 (2010).
17. Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 401, 402 (2010).
18. Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS,
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 340–41 (1999).
19. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 396 (1993).
20. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.
21. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 40,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:325:0001:0184:EN:PDF
22. See Treaty on European Union, Jul. 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, available at
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/maastricht_en.pdf; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007
O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter TFEU], available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_lisbon_treaty.pdf.
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B. The Current European Patent Does Not Provide a Unitary Right
The merits of a unified patent system in Europe will not be fully
appreciated without first examining the prevailing procedures for patent
grant and enforcement, which are closely intertwined. As will be shown,
the current European Patent system, despite being crafted in the spirit of
integration, fragments the European market and suppresses innovation.23
The present patent grant system in Europe incorporates particular
aspects of a European common market in procedure while retaining
traditional aspects of territoriality in substance.24 At one time, the
process of obtaining a patent was purely national. A patent applicant
was forced to apply simultaneously in every country in which protection
was sought, since a patent filing in one country destroyed novelty for
subsequent applications anywhere else.25 The high upfront costs were
prohibitive to most applicants seeking multinational patent protection.26
The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, or Paris Convention, became effective in 1884 and was a
primary step in harmonizing patent rights between countries.27 The Paris
Convention established two fundamental principles: (1) national
treatment, and (2) right of priority.28 National treatment requires
member states to give nationals of other member states the same
advantages under their domestic patent laws as they give to their own
nationals.29 Right of priority entitles a patent applicant of one member
country to a period of twelve months after the initial patent application
to apply for protection in all of the other member countries.30 As a
23. Joseph Straus, The Present State of the Patent System in the European Union as
Compared with the Situation in the United States of America and Japan, in MAX PLANCK
INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL PATENT, COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW 5
(1997), available at http://www.suepo.org/public/background/straus.pdf.
24. Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territoriality of Patent Law vs. the
European Union, 40 IDEA 49, 53 (2000).
25. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38
IDEA 529, 532 (1997–1998).
26. See Bender, supra note 24.
27. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583,
828
U.N.T.S.
305
[hereinafter
Paris
Convention],
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html (revised at Brussels on December 14,
1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2,
1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and amended on
September 28, 1979).
28. Id. arts. 2, 4.
29. Id. art. 2.
30. Id. art. 4.
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result, a patent applicant in any member state can enjoy an early priority
date, while gaining a full year to evaluate the economic viability of the
invention before committing the exorbitant costs of filing in multiple
countries around the world.31 One hundred seventy-four countries,
including essentially all of Europe, are contracting parties to the Paris
Convention.32
The 1970 Washington Treaty, or Patent Cooperation Treaty
(“PCT”), took an additional step toward harmonization, by allowing a
patent applicant to file an “international” patent application that has
effect in many countries.33 The treaty’s primary objective was to help
“minimize duplicative patent application and examination worldwide.”34
In brief, the PCT allows for filing of an international application in any
of several designated patent offices.35 An international search authority
(provided by one of several designated national patent offices) generally
then classifies the invention, performs a search, and provides a search
report and written opinion concerning the novelty, inventive step, and
industrial applicability.36 Generally around thirty months after filing, the
PCT application enters the “national phase,” where rights can be
continued by filing in national patent offices, along with required
translations and fees.37 Patent examiners in each country then
individually assess the patentability of the claimed invention, resulting
in either patent grant or rejection.38 Thus, while the PCT consolidates
the initial application process and provides an additional eighteen
months beyond the Paris Convention date to reflect on the desirability
of seeking protection in foreign countries, “it does not alter the
substantive requirements of patentability in the Member States.”39
31. Bender, supra note 24, at 55.
32. See Summary Table of Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2 (last visited Sep. 5,
2012). The tiny country of Brunei Darussalam was the latest to join, becoming a party on
February 17, 2012. Id.
33. See Patent Cooperation Treaty arts. 9, 11, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter PCT], available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf. (amended on
September 28, 1979, modified on February 3, 1984, and on October 3, 2001).
34. Bender, supra note 24, at 55.
35. Id. at 56.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. PCT, supra note 33, art. 27(5); see also Binder, supra note 24, at 57 (noting that member
states retain ability to legislate their own standards of patentability and restrict the types of
patents that can be granted).
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Following the PCT, Europe forged its own regional patent system.
Spurred in part by the desire to harmonize traditionally national patent
laws within the EEC, the 1973 European Patent Convention (“EPC”)
established a multinational system for granting patents throughout
Europe.40 The EPC allows an applicant to file a consolidated “European
Patent” application with the European Patent Office (“EPO”). The
European Patent is capable of granting parallel patent rights in any
number of designated countries participating in the Convention.41
Advantages of this system include: (1) a centralized grant procedure in
one of three official EPO languages (German, French, and English); (2)
reduced costs, if the applicant seeks protection in many European
countries; and (3) a comprehensive prior art search and examination.42
The EPC provides quality control through a nine-month “opposition
period” beginning immediately after the grant, during which third
parties may challenge and revoke claims of the patent.43 Independent
Boards of Appeal examine decisions of the receiving, examining, legal,
and opposition divisions of the EPO.44 Significantly, the EPC operates
outside of the framework of the Treaty of Rome, and hence the EPO is
not an EU institution.45
Participation in the EPC patent grant system has always been
optional.46 Patent applicants in the EU may forgo the EPC and directly
file patent applications with national patent offices.47 Moreover, patents
granted by the EPO for a state generally have the same effect and are
subject to the same conditions as those granted by a national patent
office.48 Nonetheless, the EPC has been highly successful.49 Patent
filings climbed from 106,346 to 142,810 with record highs in seven out
40. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter EPC], available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201065/volume-1065-I-16208-English.pdf.
(as revised by “Act revising Article 63 EPC of December 17, 1991” and “Act revising the EPC of
November 29, 2000”).
41. Id. art. 67(1).
42. Kevin R. Casey, The European Patent “Situation,” 9 DEL. L. REV. 107, 108 (2007).
43. See EPC, supra note 40, arts. 99, 100.
44. See EPO – Boards of Appeal, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.epo.org/aboutus/boards-of-apeal.htmlhttp://www.epo.org/about-us/boards-of-apeal.html.
45. Straus, supra note 23, at 1.
46. See Seth Cannon, Achieving the Benefits of a Centralized Community Patent System at
Minimal Cost, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 415, 418 (2003).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 419.
49. Id.
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of ten years.50The number of “European Patents” granted also generally
increased from 49,365 in 2002 to 64,346 in 2011.51As of this writing,
thirty-eight member states participate in the EPC.52
C. The National Courts Cannot Harmonize Fragmented Patent Rights
The proponents of a unified European Community faced a major
hurdle in their efforts toward harmonizing patent enforcement. While
the EPC provided a logical foundation, its end product was a
nonstarter—a “bundle” of national patent rights that must be enforced
individually in the national courts of its respective member states.53 The
EPC created a unified system for examining and granting patents, yet
infringement disputes are adjudicated by national courts.54 Each court
applies its own national rules for claim construction and infringement
analysis, which creates the potential for inconsistent infringement
rulings.55 As noted by scholar Graeme Dinwoodie:
To obtain relief in more than one country for acts of intellectual
property infringement, a plaintiff was required to sue separately in
every country in which infringement was alleged to have occurred,
notwithstanding that the allegations might involve the same conduct
by the same defendant with respect to what in fact was the same
56
piece of intellectual property.

In 1989, Dutch courts led the initial charge against territoriality
with a landmark decision in a trademark case, Lincoln v. Interlas, which
established the basis for multinational patent enforcement for nearly two
decades.57 Interlas was a Dutch company that “imported diesel welding
units bearing the ‘Lincoln’ trademark from the U.S. into the
Netherlands, modified the units, and offered them for sale throughout

50. European Patent Applications Filed with the EPO, EUR. PAT. OFF. (June 6, 2011),
http://www.epo.org/about-us/statistics/patent-applications.html.
51. Id.
52. Member States of the European Patent Organisation, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-states.html [hereinafter EPO Member States].
53. See EPC, supra note 40, art. 2(2); Mossinghoff & Kuo, supra note 25, at 542.
54. See EPC, supra note 40, arts. 63(2).
55. See Brian Turner, The German Formstein Case: An Alternative Harmony, 14 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 181 (1992).
56. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Boundaries of Intellectual Property Symposium: Crossing
Boundaries: Developing A Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise Of
Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 733 (2009).
57. HR 24 November, 1989, NJ 1992, 404 m.nt. (Lincoln/Interlas) (Neth.).
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Europe.”58 The Dutch owner of the trademark sued Interlas for
trademark infringement in the Netherlands.59 The owner, who also held
trademark rights in Belgium and Luxembourg, sought injunctive relief
in all three countries.60 At that time, rules of international jurisdiction
were set out by the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Brussels
Convention”) and made applicable to EU member states.61 The Dutch
court granted the injunction in the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg.62 On appeal, the Dutch Supreme Court affirmed the
injunction on the basis that intellectual property transcends national
borders and it would be undesirable for an injured party to be forced to
file suit in every country where infringement occurred.63
Following Interlas, Dutch courts extended the principle of crossborder injunctive relief to matters of patent infringement.64 Although the
Brussels Convention does not directly address patent infringement,
Dutch courts cited Article 24 of the agreement, which provided that
“application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such
provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under
the laws of that state, even if, under this Convention, the courts of
another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the
matter.”65 Patent holders bringing enforcement proceedings in Dutch
courts also successfully invoked a nuance in the Brussels Convention
that further extended their jurisdictional reach.66 Article 6(1) allows
defendants to a multi-party suit who are domiciled in different
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention], available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:41968A0927(01):EN:HTML.
(the Brussels Convention was later revised in the 1978 Accession Convention to include Article
Vd, which provided “exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State for any
European patent granted for that state, regardless of domicile of the defendant and without
prejudice to the jurisdiction of the EPO under the EPC.” Straus, supra note 23, at 406.
62. Lincoln/Interlas, supra note 57.
63. Id.
64. Kerry J. Begley, Multinational Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United
States Can Learn from Past and Present European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521, 546
(2007).
65. Brussels Convention, supra note 61, art. 24. See also Begley, supra note 64, at 547.
66. Beth Z. Shaw, Court Rules Against Cross-Border Enforcement of “European” Patent
Rights, Legal Opinion Letter, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/100606shaw.pdf.
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contracting states to be sued in any contracting state where one of the
defendants is domiciled.67 Before long, the Netherlands became an
attractive European forum for patent proprietors fighting infringement
of patent equivalents in other countries.68
Almost seventeen years after the Interlas decision, the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ,” now the Court of Justice for the European
Union69) dealt a heavy blow to cross-border injunction practice in Roche
Nederland v. Primus (“Roche”) and Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik
mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG
(“GAT”).70 As will be explained, Roche and GAT severely limited the
practical ability for companies to consolidate enforcement proceedings
when infringement is suspected in multiple countries.
In Roche, two U.S. doctors, Primus and Goldenberg, sought
consolidated infringement proceedings in Dutch courts against Roche
Nederland BV and eight other companies in the Roche group.71 The
eight non-Dutch companies in the Roche group contested the
jurisdiction of the Dutch court.72 Citing Article 6(1) of the Brussels
Convention, the lower court held that it had jurisdiction over all nine codefendants.73 The question was appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court,
and then to the ECJ,74 which ultimately held that the dispositive rule was
Article 2, which provides that “persons domiciled in a contracting state
of the Brussels Convention must be sued in the courts of that state.”75
According to the court, the Article 6(1) exception was inapposite
because it only applies if the defendants’ acts were so connected that it
would be “expedient to determine the actions together in order to avoid
the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate
proceedings.”76 Since patent rights must be considered in view of the
67. Brussels Convention, supra note 61, art. 6(1).
68. Marketa Trimble, Emerging Scholar Series: Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Patent
Cases and Their Enforcement Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331, 357 (2009).
69. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union adopted a new institutional framework in which
the court system of the European Union will be known as the Court of Justice of the European
Union, or CJEU. The CJEU comprises three courts: the Court of Justice, the General Court and
the Civil Service Tribunal. To avoid confusion, the abbreviation “ECJ” will continue to be used
in this Note when referring to the Court of Justice within the CJEU.
70. Begley, supra note 64, at 525.
71. See Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535 at I-6575-76.
72. Begley, supra note 64, at 549.
73. Id. at 550.
74. Id.
75. Brussels Convention, supra note 61, art. 2.
76. Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. at I-6535.
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relevant national law of each member state, divergent holdings on
infringement could not be deemed to be “irreconcilable,” therefore
rendering cross-border enforcement unavailable.77
In GAT, the ECJ addressed a second stumbling block to patent
enforcement—the issue of patent invalidity.78 The claimant GAT was
competing with LuK to supply a third party company with a mechanical
damper spring.79 LuK alleged that GAT was in breach of certain French
patents of which it was the registered proprietor.80 GAT then filed suit in
a German court requesting a declaration that LuK had no entitlement
under the French patents and further that the patents were invalid.81 The
German court held that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate both the
infringement and invalidity issues, a matter which GAT appealed and
thereafter referred to the ECJ.82 The ECJ held for GAT, reasoning that
under Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, the national courts of
the granting state have exclusive jurisdiction as to patent validity.83
Further, this exclusive jurisdiction applies irrespective of whether the
party challenging the validity brought proceedings specifically to
invalidate the patent, or merely as a defense to an infringement action.84
This end result is inimical to centralized patent infringement
proceedings, because accused patent infringers routinely assert
invalidity of the patent as a defense.85
In conclusion, the Roche and GAT cases highlight the reluctance of
the ECJ to compromise the national interest of EU member states and
raise legal considerations concerning these national interests that must
77. Id. at I-6581.
78. Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft fur Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509 at I-6526.
79. Id. at I-6528, ¶ 9.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
83. Id. ¶ 22.
84. Begley, supra note 64, at 552.
85. Id. at 553. This case also foreshadows an obstacle in the enforcement of a modern
unitary patent right, that of bifurcation. Bifurcation involves separating questions of patent
validity from those of infringement into different proceedings, and is presently used in Germany.
Since questions of infringement are generally decided more quickly than questions of invalidity,
patentees tend to benefit. If unchecked, however, bifurcation can proliferate forum shopping and
greater uncertainty in patent protection. See, e.g., Benjamin Henrion, EU Patent Plans are a Fuel
(Apr.
27,
2012),
for
Patent
Trolls,
Says
British
Telecom,
FFII.ORG
http://press.ffii.org/Press%20releases/EU%20patent%20plans%20are%20a%20fuel%20for%20pa
tent%20trolls%2C%20says%20British%20Telecom?action=print (on the potential effects of
bifurcation on a unitary patent court system).
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be addressed in synthesizing a unitary patent system.
D. A Fragmented Patent System is Detrimental
to the European Economy
On a fundamental level, the EU exists for three reasons: “to
prevent war, to promote political unity, and for economic integration.”86
These reasons cannot be considered independently, but rather flow
together from the interaction and interests shared amongst the European
countries. Based on these precepts, it can be shown that the absence of a
unitary patent right in Europe severely damages economic integration,
which is central to the EU itself.
First, at the outset, the cost of obtaining community-wide patent
protection can be prohibitively high under the present system. Consider,
for example, the costs of patent protection in six European countries
(Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom) vis-à-vis the United States. A May 2008 study indicated that
the cumulative costs of procedural fees, translation costs, and renewal
fees were about €9,000—four to six times more expensive than in the
United States.87 This inequity is also understated, considering that this
comparison substantially under-represents Europe by discounting the
lack of patent protection in thirty-two of the thirty-eight countries. 88 If
patent protection were extended to all EPC member states, such
protection would cost at least fifteen times more than in the United
States.89 As a result, even large multinational companies can be
disinclined to file patents in many European countries.90
The costs of parallel patent litigation are similarly exorbitant.
According to a 2009 study, initiating patent litigation proceedings in
just four European jurisdictions—Germany, France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom—could accrue total costs ranging from
€310,000, if the case is resolved at the court of first instance, to €3.6
million if accounting for the cost of appeal.91 These costs, which can be
86. Bryony Jones, Why is Unity So Important to Europe? CNN (Nov. 4, 2011, 12:49 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/04/world/europe/european-unity-explainer/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.
87. See Mejer, supra note 13.
88. Bruno van Pottelsberghe & Jérôme Danguy, Economic Cost-Benefits Analysis of the
COMM’N
(Sept.
7,
2012),
Community
Patent
7,
EUR.
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/compact-cost%20-benefit-studyfinal_en.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 7.
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about twice as high as in the United States, are prohibitive for many
individuals and small- and medium-sized companies.92 Considering the
totality of these factors, it is no surprise that many of these companies
decide against pursuing patent protection altogether.93 Without the
benefit of patent protection, many of these companies would just as well
conduct their business and invest their capital elsewhere.
Second, patent applicants in Europe must tolerate a dimension of
uncertainty in patent enforcement that is substantially reduced in
markets with integrated patent systems, such as the United States or
Japan.94 This uncertainty is inherent to litigating patent rights separately
in respective member states, since different courts can arrive at contrary
conclusions on essentially the same facts.95As in the Euro banknotes
case discussed in Part I, a duplicative and internally inconsistent patent
system results in legal uncertainty and encourages forum shopping.96
This is evidenced by a recent study showing about one thousand
infringement cases per year in Germany, about 250 per year in France,
about one hundred per year in Italy, about fifty in each of the UK and
the Netherlands, with fourteen countries with fewer than ten cases per
year, and nine countries with no cases per year.97 Forum shopping is
undesirable because it leads to a system where the validity,
enforceability and scope of patents are unpredictable.98 Even setting
aside litigation costs, such a system can stall innovation because
inventors and capitalists, being uncertain of the metes and bounds of
patent protection, operate with reduced confidence that they will recoup
expenditures in developing patented inventions.99
Third, the present system suffers from the indirect effect of
92. Id.
93. Straus, supra note 23, at 18.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id. at 15.
96. See Begley, supra note 64, at 551.
97. Matthias Sontag, Das EuGH-Gutachten zur Europäischen Patentgerichtsbarkeit–
Rückschlag
oder
Chance?,
(Apr.
13,
2011),
available
at
http://www.duslaw.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Juristische_Fakultaet/CIP/Sonntag__EUPatent.pdf.
98. See, e.g., Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The United States Patent Reform Quagmire: A
Balanced Proposal, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 709, 723 (2005) (reviewing ADAM B. JAFFE &
JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004) (which
describes the marked disparity in attitudes toward patents for different regional circuits in the
U.S., and resulting inconsistencies in patent enforcement)).
99. Id. at 724.
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community-wide exhaustion of patent rights.100 Patent exhaustion is a
loss of patent right that occurs when a patented product is put on the
market by the patent owner or with the patent owner’s consent.101 The
ECJ has held that this patent exhaustion occurs simultaneously across
the entire European Community when the patented product is placed in
any EU member state.102 Once the owner’s patent rights are so
“exhausted,” the product can freely circulate throughout the Community
and even be re-imported into a country where the product is ostensibly
protected by a valid patent.103 Without a Community Patent right, a
patent owner seeking broad protection faces two unappealing
alternatives: incur the inflated costs of obtaining patents in many
European countries, or save costs by filing in just a few countries while
conceding the right to exclude others from practicing their invention
everywhere else.104 Today, under Community-wide patent exhaustion, a
patent owner who decides to compete by placing products within a
country without the benefit of patent protection not only faces a
potential price war, but also the risk that any products sold will be
legally imported into countries where the patent owner already has
patent protection.105
In sum, businesses, particularly small and mid-sized companies,
have encountered substantial hardship in enforcing their patents and in
defending themselves against unfounded claims and patents that should
arguably be revoked.106 As shown, despite best efforts to liberalize
multinational patent enforcement, the lack of a unitary patent right in
Europe has resulted in both uncertainty in the value of patent rights and
inefficiencies in patent litigation.
III. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES FRUSTRATE THE CREATION
OF A UNITARY PATENT SYSTEM
With the current economic plight in Europe, the problems
highlighted in Part II have brought a sense of urgency for coherent
100. Straus, supra note 23, at 8.
101. Id. at v.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Mejer, supra note 13.
105. Straus, supra note 23, at 9.
106. Draft Agreement to a Unified Patent Court, Council of the European Union, 1, Dec.
1153/11 (Jun. 14, 2011), [hereinafter June 2011 Draft Agreement], available at
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/889924E4E28C5D0CC12578D3003F504
6/$File/st11533_en.pdf.
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action by European countries.107 The Europe 2020 Strategy, for
example, specifically identified the need for growth that is sustainable,
inclusive, and based on knowledge and innovation.108 Proponents also
argue that the principle of territoriality has shackled progressive patent
reform for too long, and that it should give way to the commercial
realities of an interconnected world.109 Yet, such reform should be
balanced against EU law, which recognizes the prescriptive interests of
the national member states in the European community.110
The European community responded with a resurgence of drafts,
revisions, and legal opinions directed to: (1) a unitary patent right, and
(2) a dedicated Patent Court to enforce the unitary patent right.111 As
will be shown, the unitary patent and the Patent Court are closely
interdependent. The unitary patent needs a court system to administer
cross-border enforcement,112 and the Patent Court needs a legally
grounded unitary patent regulation to provide basic rules on jurisdiction
and enforcement, as well as provisions for organizing and financing the
system.113
A. The Unitary Patent Regulation Must Harmonize the EPC
and the Lisbon Treaty
It may be somewhat surprising that a unitary patent right was
envisioned decades ago in Article 142 of the EPC, which allows for a
group of contracting states to provide a patent right having “unitary
character throughout their territories.”114 Just two years after the signing
of the EPC, a unitary patent right formed the basis of a so-called
Community Patent Convention, which provided a centralized grant
procedure based on a uniform right and conducted in a single
107. European Commission, EUROPE 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth, at 2, COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF.
108. Id.
109. Dinwoodie, supra note 56, at 734.
110. Id. at 732.
111. Phil Carey, Europe’s Unified Patent Litigation System Inches Nearer, WINSTON &
STRAWN
LLP
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/The%20European_Unitary_Patent.pdf.
112. See Khurram Aziz, Council of Europe Forges Ahead with EU Patent Plan Despite Legal
Setback, INTELL. PROP. MAG. (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.ipworld.com/ipwo/doc/view.htm?id=264031&searchCode=H.
113. See, e.g., Unitary Patent/EU Patent News & Issues, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.epo.org/news-issues/issues/eu-patent.html.
114. EPC, supra note 40, art. 142.
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language.115 The Community Patent would confer “a protection right
with a unitary character which has equal effect throughout the
Community and can only be granted, assigned, annulled or extended in
respect of the whole of the Community.”116 While this effort was borne
amidst hopes that such a harmonized patent right would simplify
infringement actions and reduce associated costs, the concept faced
substantial challenges, and was never signed.117
Probably the greatest source of frustration in ratifying the unitary
patent is the problem of translations.118 For a community with twentythree official languages, this has historically been a quagmire fraught
with administrative and political controversy.119 The dilemma is that full
translations are needed (1) to meet the information function of patents
and (2) to facilitate local enforcement. Yet providing translations in
every country is unworkable from a cost perspective.120 A second
problem stems from the fact that, while all EU members are also EPC
members, the reverse is not true—as of this writing, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Turkey, Monaco, Iceland, amongst others, are members
of the EPC but not the EU.121 Although a modernized Community
Patent Regulation was proposed in 2000, it failed to adequately address
either the language issue or the need for a patent judiciary for
enforcement, and did not gain traction.122
Notwithstanding these difficulties, it appears that the unitary patent
115. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975, 1976 O.J.
(L 17) 43, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1976:017:0043:0043:EN:PDF;
Jorge Cruz, The Community Patent Convention: What Sort of Future?, 1 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 819, 820–21 (1998).
116. Cruz, supra note 115, at 820. The “Community Patent” of 1975 was necessarily
enforceable over the entire European “community,” which at the time consisted of only twelve
member states. This should be distinguished from the modern Unitary Patent, which may have
unitary effect over only a portion of the European community (now known as the European
Union). Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 824.
119. See EU Administration – Staff, Languages and Location, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/administration/index_en.htm.
120. See EPC, supra note 40, arts. 69, 83, 97(3), 98; Hanns Ullrich, Harmonizing Patent
Law: The Untamable Union Patent 10, (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop. & Competition,
Law Research Paper No. 12-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027920
(recognizing the problems with inadequate translations and high costs).
121. See EPO Member States, supra note 52; The Member Countries of the European Union,
EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-member-countries/index_en.htm. This mismatch is
problematic because parties belonging to the EPC but not the EU would not be bound by EU law.
122. Ulrich, supra note 120, at 6.
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could still become a reality. Recent efforts were guided by a key
provision in the Lisbon Treaty that expressly authorizes a unitary patent
right.123 Article 118(1) allows the bicameral EU legislature, comprised
of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
(“Council”), to act on legislative proposals by the European
Commission (“Commission”) to establish European intellectual
property rights “by means of regulations, acting in accordance with
ordinary legislative procedure.”124 Article 118(2), however, requires that
language arrangements would be established under a special legislative
procedure by the Council acting unanimously after consulting the
European Parliament.125 Thus, the translation arrangements for any
unitary patent system in the EU must be established by a separate
regulation.126
Twin regulations directed to the unitary patent and translation
arrangements were submitted to the Council in December 2009 and
June 2010, respectively.127 Despite the best efforts by the Presidency of
the Council to broker a deal on translations, talks collapsed128 when
Spain and Italy objected to any regulation that did not provide for
translations into their respective languages.129 To overcome this
impasse, the Commission submitted a new proposal to the Council to
authorize enhanced cooperation, a procedural tool that allows a subset
of EU member states to conclude an agreement amongst themselves
under certain conditions.130 In a major breakthrough, the Council
123. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the Council and the European
Parliament and of the Council Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation
of Unitary Patent Protection, & Proposal for a Council Regulation Implementing Enhanced
Cooperation in the Area of Unitary Patent Protection with Regard to the Applicable Translation
Arrangements – General Approach, Council Of The European Union, 2, Doc. 11328/11 (June 23,
2011) [hereinafter Draft Unitary Patent Regulation], available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st11/st11328.en11.pdf.
124. TFEU, supra note 22, art. 188(c).
125. Id. art. 118(2).
126. Draft Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 123, at 2.
127. Id.
128. Press Release, Council European Union, Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry,
Research
and
Space)
(Nov.
10,
2010),
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/117687.pdf.
129. Ullrich, supra note 120, at 11; see also, Italy and Spain Block EU-wide Patent Talks,
EURACTIV (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/innovation/italy-and-spain-block-eu-widepatent-talks-news-499638 (noting that Spain viewed the European Commission’s proposal to
limit translations to English, German, and French as discriminatory).
130. Council Decision Authorising Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Creation of
Unitary Patent Protection, Mar. 10, 2011, O.J. L 76/53, art. 1, available at http://eur-
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adopted the proposal in March 2011 and authorized twenty-five of the
twenty-seven EU member states (Spain and Italy excluded) to
implement enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent
protection.131
The current proposal would create a unitary patent, based on
Articles 118(1) and 118(2), that operates alongside the current national
and European patents and could be filed in any language of the EU. The
unitary patent itself, however, would only be granted in one of the three
official EU languages (English, German, and French).132 During a
transitional period, further language translations could be triggered in
the event of a dispute and would be paid for by the patent proprietor.133
During this transitional period, machine translations would be
aggressively developed with the objective of having, in time, the unitary
patent available in the official language for every Member
State.134Although Spain and Italy filed complaints with the ECJ
challenging the Council’s authorization of enhanced cooperation, their
resistance appears to have abated somewhat in recent months, leading
some to express cautious optimism that one or both countries may soon
drop their opposition.135
B. A New Patent Court System Must Comply with EU Law
On a second front, efforts were underway to create a patent court
vested with the power to enforce a unitary patent right.136 The European
Patent Litigation Agreement (“EPLA”) was a seminal effort. Frustrated
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:076:0053:0055:en:PDF. The invocation
of “enhanced cooperation” requires a minimum of nine EU Member States. Its purpose is to
overcome a deadlock where a proposal is blocked by the veto of a state or group of states who do
not wish to be involved. In order for the use of enhanced cooperation to be approved, all other
avenues must have been exhausted, and it must be impossible to attain the objectives in a
reasonable period by the EU as a whole. Additionally, enhanced cooperation may not be used to
discriminate against Member States and its use must further the objectives of the EU.
131. Id.
132. See Draft Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 123, at 3, 12.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 33.
135. See Italy, Spain Could Drop Opposition to EU Patent, EURACTIV (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/italy-spain-drop-opposition-eu-patent-news509433; Ullrich, supra note 120, at 11.
136. EU – The Future Unified Patent Litigation System in the European Union,
(Sept.
28,
2011),
EPLAWPATENTBLOG.COM
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2011/09/friday-23-september-2011-academy-ofeuropean-laws-conference-the-future-unified-patent-litigation-system-in-the-european-un.html.
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with the stalled efforts at the EU level, a Working Party on Litigation,
formed from EPO member states, drafted the EPLA in November
2003.137 The agreement would commit its signatory states to an
integrated judicial system having a Court of First Instance and Appeal,
with a central division and regional divisions.138 The agreement also
obviated the requirement that states provide translations into their own
languages so long as the patent specification was translated into an
official EPO language (French, German or English).139 However, in
2007, the Legal Service of the European Parliament concluded that the
EPLA violated Article 292 of the then-prevailing EU treaty (Maastricht
Treaty), since member states would have to contract to form the EPLA
outside of EU governance.140 In hindsight, while the EPLA was
ultimately a failure, it identified important legal issues that would shape
future proposals.
In 2007, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty breathed new life into the
Patent Court project. Based on its interpretation of Article 118, the
Commission constructed a draft agreement and statute that
contemplated an integrated Patent Court with a Court of First Instance,
a Court of Appeal and a Registry.141 Under the agreement, the Patent
Court would be common to the contracting member states and have
exclusive competence on their territories for both community patents
and patents granted under the present EPC regime.142 The agreement
also contained substantive provisions aimed at preventing inconsistent
enforcement proceedings between different countries by harmonizing,
for example, the definitions of infringing acts and indirect
infringement.143 The Patent Court could refer questions to the ECJ
concerning the interpretation of EU treaties or the validity and
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the EU.144 ECJ decisions
would be binding on the Patent Court to the extent that the decision
137. Gary Moss & Matthew Jones, Patents and Patent Litigation in Europe – Past, Present
and Future, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (June 2011), http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2011/06/patentsand-patent-litigation-in-europe-past-present-and-future.asp.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (noting Article 292 of the EC Treaty, which recites, “Member States undertake not to
submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of
settlement other than those provided for therein.”).
141. EPLA – European Patent Litigation Agreement, EUR. PAT. OFF.
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legislative-initiatives/epla.htm (last updated Apr. 3, 2009).
142. June 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 106, at 4.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13.
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takes effect in a member state of the EU.145
The ECJ soon brought down its gavel on the fledgling EPLA.
Pursuant to a request by the Council, the ECJ issued a negative opinion
in March 2011, stating that the proposal failed to comport with
European Union law.146 According to the ECJ, the proposed Patent
Court was “outside the institutional and judicial framework of the
European Union” and had “a distinct legal personality under
international law.”147 Because the draft agreement conferred exclusive
jurisdiction on the proposed Patent Court, the courts of the member
states would have been “divested of that jurisdiction,” and deprived of
their power to refer questions to the ECJ in the field of patents.148 The
ECJ concluded by noting that any viable patent system cannot “alter the
essential character of the powers conferred on the institutions of the
European Union and on the Member States which are indispensable to
the preservation of the very nature of European Union law.”149
Despite the unequivocal setback, proponents of the unitary patent
project were undaunted, some even welcoming the points raised as
providing “important clarification for the further development of the
project.”150 Three months later, the Hungarian EU Council presidency
published a revised version of the draft agreement on what is now
known as the “Unified Patent Court” further revised by the Polish
Presidency in September 2011.151 The revised draft contained specific
provisions to address the ECJ objections, for example: (1) the
contracting member states regard the Unified Patent Court to be part of
the judicial system of the European Union and subject to the same
obligations as a national court with regards to the respect of EU law,
and (2) elimination of non-EU member states from the agreement such
that the Patent Court is common only to EU member states.152 A flurry
145. Id.
146. Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Draft Agreement on the
Creation of a European and Community Patent Court Not Compatible with European Union Law
(Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201103/cp110017en.pdf (reporting on Opinion 1/09 of the Court).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Court of Justice Delivers Opinion on European and EU Patents Court Draft Agreement,
PAT.
OFF.
(Mar.
8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.epo.org/newsEUR.
issues/news/2011/20110308a.html.
151. Draft Agreement on a Unified Patent Court and Draft Statute – Revised Presidency Text,
Council of the European Union, Sept. 2, 2011, Doc. 13751/11.
152. Id. at 4.
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of subsequent minor revisions culminated in a draft published by the
Council in November 2011.153
At the time of this writing, it is unclear whether or not the present
draft will satisfy the ECJ. However, even if one were to accept these
proposals, they raise an important checking question. Does the proposed
unitary patent system, as amended, adequately address the fundamental
problems that this project was originally intended to solve? To unpack
this question, the proposed Patent Court will be juxtaposed with two
exemplary judicial systems: (1) the U.S. Federal courts, and (2) the
European Community design courts.154 The sections below will examine
differences between these approaches in the particular context of the
roles played by the courts, rates of precedential formation, and their
resulting effects on quality control and legal certainty.
IV. THE COMMUNITY DESIGN COURTS AND THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS
BOTH IMPLEMENT A UNITARY PATENT SYSTEM, BUT THE FORMER
PROVIDES SUPERIOR QUALITY CONTROL
The U.S. Federal courts are an independent national judiciary with
jurisdiction over cases involving the laws and treaties of the United
States, including patent law.155 The European Community design courts
(“Community design courts”) are courts whose jurisdiction is confined
to issues of infringement and invalidity for Community designs.156
Although both courts enforce a unitary intellectual property right, the
U.S. courts of first instance are generalist courts while the Community
design courts are specialized. As will be shown, this distinction is
significant because the limited jurisdiction of the latter tends to promote
greater legal certainty in enforcement. Accordingly, the Community
153. Doc. 16741/11, Working Document, Draft Agreement on a Unified Patent Court and
Draft Statute – Revised Presidency Text, Council of the European Union (Nov. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter
November
2011
Draft
Agreement],
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st16/st16741.en11.pdf. Articles revised in this draft
include Articles 18 (budget); 19 (financing); 58 (transitional period); 58a (ratification, depositing
and notification); 58d (revision); and 59 (entry into force).
154. It is undeniable that there are fundamental technical differences between Community
designs and patents; notwithstanding, this Note postulates that the foundation of the court system
used for Community Designs can nonetheless provide guiding principles that could inform the
creation of an effective patent court system.
155. See Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, U.S. CTS. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Jurisdiction.aspx
[hereinafter Federal Court Jurisdiction].
156. See Judgments of the Community Design Courts, OFF. HARMONIZATION INT. MKT.
(Mar. 14, 2011), http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/caseLaw/judgementsCDCourts.en.do.
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design approach is better situated to achieve the goals of a unitary
patent system, although compliance with EU law would require further
modifications to this system.
A. The U.S. Federal Court Model Achieves a Unified System but
Encourages Forum Shopping
The current U.S. patent litigation regime provides a useful parallel
model for analyzing the merits of litigating a unitary patent in the
national courts of European member states. Under the U.S. model,
federal district courts are the courts of first instance for cases involving
laws of the United States, including patent cases.157 In patent cases,
district court appeals go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“CAFC”), an appellate court with nationwide jurisdiction in
enumerated subject areas.158 Intellectual property cases comprise about
30% of CAFC cases, nearly all of them involving patents.159 Because the
CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from U.S. district courts
concerning matters of patent law, it provides a check on these courts.160
Established in 1982, the CAFC was commissioned “to promote
greater uniformity in certain areas of federal jurisdiction and relieve the
pressure on the dockets of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals
for the regional circuits.”161 In part, this court eliminates some
“inconsistencies in the application and interpretation of patent law
across federal courts.”162 The CAFC role in harmonizing patent law
across the federal court system may be partially reflected in an increase
in settlement rates associated with patent cases, because harmonization
inherently increases legal certainty, which in turn reduces the need for
litigation.163 For example, following the establishment of the CAFC, the
157. See Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, supra note 155.
158. Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/thecourt/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) (listing the enumerated subject areas,
which include international trade, government contracts, patents, trademarks, some money claims
against the United States government, federal personnel, veterans’ benefits, and public safety
officers’ benefits claims).
159. Id.
160. Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
161. Fed. Jud. Center, Landmark Judicial Legislation, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_22.html.
162. Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco, & John L. Turner, The Economics of a Centralized
Judiciary, Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 441 (Aug.
2009) [hereinafter The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary].
163. Alberto Galasso & Mark A. Schankerman, Patent Thickets and the Market for
Innovation: Evidence from Settlement of Patent Disputes, 28 CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES.,
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time for arriving at a settlement decreased by 7.8 months (which is,
depending on the type of patent involved, roughly one third to one half
of the ex ante settlement time).164
One way to measure the quality, and associated credibility, of a
court is to examine the rate at which the rulings of that court are
reversed on appeal.165 By this metric, the high rate of reversals by the
CAFC of district court decisions on the construction of patent claims
may be cause for concern.166 A recent study reported that the CAFC
reversed on the basis of erroneous claim construction about forty
percent of the time, even as its overall reversal rate ranged from eleven
to fourteen percent.167 Reversal rates are meaningful, particularly when
comparing the merits of different judicial approaches, because a high
likelihood of reversal adds uncertainty in patent litigation.168 Mindful
that patent law operates within commercial law, such legal uncertainty
not only contravenes a stated object of the unitary patent system, but
also chills the business activity of patent practitioners and potential
infringers alike, which rely on certainty over claim scope to make
timely business decisions.169
A factor contributing to this problem may be the lack of judicial
precedent in most U.S. district courts.170 For example, in the twelvemonth period ending September 30, 2010, there were about 361
thousand total civil and criminal filings across the United States, and
Discussion Paper No. 6946 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401775 (modeling that
the introduction of CAFC resulted in a direct and large reduction on the duration of disputes
because of less uncertainty about the outcome if the dispute goes to trial).
164. Id. at 20–21.
165. See James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the
United States, 1 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 101, 103 (2007), available at
http://www.jltp.uiuc.edu/archives/holderman.pdf (on the ramifications of high reversal rates,
namely the erosion of trust in the lower court claim construction rulings and reluctance of
disappointed litigants to settle).
166. See id.
167. See id.; Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending, U.S. CT. APPEALS FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
167. See id. (showing that over the 12-month period ending September 30 of each year from
2006–2011, the percentages of CAFC cases terminating in a reversal were 12%, 14%, 13%, 11%,
12%, and 13%, respectively).
168. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 165, at 102; Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping
In Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?,79 N.C.L. REV. 889, 927 (2001).
169. See September 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 146, at 7; Galasso & Schankerman,
supra note 163, at 1 (noting that, in patent disputes, delay and uncertainty in the settlement and
licensing process mean slower diffusion of patented technology).
170. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 165, at 104–05.

78

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:55

less than one percent (i.e., about 3,300) of those cases involved
patents.171 The lack of subject matter specialization is noteworthy, since
U.S. district court judges deal with a large and diverse caseload and
typically do not concentrate on staying abreast of the changing nuances
of any one area of the law, such as patent law.172 Some have surmised
that the large caseload confronting district court judges may be further
exacerbating the problem.173
A related problem with the U.S. approach is that different courts of
first instance use different judicial procedures, resulting in considerable
variation in speeds of adjudication and patentee win rates from district
to district.174 These factors provide strong incentives for forum
shopping, even in the integrated U.S. patent system.175 For example, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in Marshall, Texas
has long been a popular forum for patent lawsuits, since it found in
favor of the plaintiff seventy-sight percent of the time, compared to a
national average of fifty-nine percent.176 Even when the merits favor the
defendant in a patent case, a strongly pro-plaintiff forum can put great
pressure on the defendant to settle matters quickly and privately.177 Such
an outcome would be contrary to the goals of the unitary patent
Regulation and Patent Court agreement, namely providing a patent with
unitary character and providing “uniform protection,” with “equal effect
in all participating Member States.”178
B. The Community Design Model Improves upon the U.S. Model by
Promoting Legal Certainty
Turning now to the Community design regime, it is interesting to
note that Europe has already set a legal precedent for integrating
European intellectual property rights through EU institutions. For
171. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Tables C-2A
& D-2 (2006–11) [hereinafter U.S. Caseload Statistics] (reporting the statistics for U.S. District
Court cases commenced during the 12-month periods ending September 30 of each year from
2006–2010 as follows (patent cases/total cases): 2830/325,906 (0.87%); 2896/325,417 (0.89%);
2909/337,686 (0.86%); 2792/352,619 (0.79%); and 3301/360,908 (0.91%)).
172. See Holderman & Guren, supra note 165, at 104.
173. Id.
174. See Moore, supra note 168, at 908–09, 916–23.
175. Id. at 892.
176. Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006),
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60E10FC35550C778EDDA00894DE404482.
177. Id.
178. Draft Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 123, at 15.
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example, in 1995, Community legislation established the Community
Plant Variety Office to protect a unitary plant variety right throughout
Europe.179 This was followed shortly thereafter by the Community
Trademark in 1996.180 Administered by the Office for Harmonization in
the Internal Market, a EU agency, this trademark right also enjoys
Community-wide effect.181 The Community design came into being
soon after.
The Community design bears some similarities to both patents and
trademarks. Like patents, the design is a form of intellectual property.182
Legally, the design represents the outward appearance of a product or
part of it, resulting from the lines, contours, colors, shape, texture,
materials, and/or ornamentation.183 An application to register a
Community design requires a request for registration, information
identifying the applicant and a representation of a design, typically
based on one or more illustrations.184 To be valid, a Community design
must be novel and have “individual character.”185 Unlike patent
applications, however, designs are only examined for compliance with
formalities; no substantive search is conducted at the time of
application.186 Designs also differ from patent rights in that they cover
the appearance of a product, rather than its function.187 Designs have
emerged as an established component in the portfolio of major
industries, such as clothing, automobiles, jewelry, and furniture.188
179. See
The
Mission
of
the
CVPO,
CMTY. PLANT VARIETY OFF,
http://www.cpvo.europa.eu/main/en/home/about-the-cpvo/its-mission (last visited Oct. 6, 2012);
see also Council Regulation (EC) On Community Plant Variety Rights, July 27, 1994, 1994 O.C.
(L 227) 1 (governing the system of Community plant variety protection).
180. See Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond The International Harmonization of Trademark Law:
The Community Trade Mark as a Model of Unitary Transnational Trademark Protection, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 309, 338 (2000).
181. See id. at 338–39.
182. What Is a Design?, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INT. MKT. (May 28, 2008),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/design.en.do [hereinafter OHIM].
183. Id.
184. Guidelines for the Examination of Community Designs, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION INT.
MKT.
4
(Aug.
7,
2008),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/legalReferences/guidelines.en/office/aspects/pdf/Exam
Guidelines.pdf.do.
185. Examination Guidelines Community Design, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION INT. MKT. 8
(Aug. 7, 2008), http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/pdf/guidelines_inv.pdf.
186. OHIM, supra note 182.
187. Id.
188. Christopher M. Aide, The Community Design: European Union-Wide Protection for
Your Design Portfolio, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 35 (2003).
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In 2001, the Council of the EU promulgated by regulation “a
unified system for obtaining a Community design to which uniform
protection is given with uniform effect throughout the entire territory of
the Community.”189 The Community design system also addresses
problems that are common to those of the unitary patent, including
differences between laws of member states which prevent and distort
Community-wide competition, and divisions of the internal market that
pose obstacles to the free movement of goods.190
Under the Community design regime, and unlike the U.S. model,
the existing national courts do not adjudicate on design matters; instead,
member states designate in their territories a limited number of national
courts and tribunals of first and second instance (Community design
courts) that perform the functions assigned to them.191 These
Community design courts have exclusive jurisdiction for matters of
infringement and invalidity of Community designs.192 These courts have
the power to impose both injunctions and damages that have effect
throughout the EU.193
The designation of a specialized court has several important
consequences. Recall that only a small fraction of cases heard by U.S.
district courts each year are patent cases.194 By comparison, all of the
cases heard in Community design courts involve Community designs. It
can be inferred that, between the two court systems, the Community
design courts will have a much richer body of precedent, since a
specialized court will generally hear the same legal issue at a
considerably higher rate than a non-specialized court.195 Second, it can
be inferred that judges sitting on a specialized court will have greater
exposure and opportunity to develop expertise required to properly
adjudicate the legal issues at hand, leading to a higher degree of
189. Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs, Dec.
12, 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 3) 1 [hereinafter Community Design Regulation], available at
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/resource/documents/RCD/regulations/62002_en_cv.pdf
(later
amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 Amending
Regulations (EC) No 6/2002 and (EC) No 40/94 to Give Effect to the Accession of the European
Community to the Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Industrial Designs (2006 O.J. (L 386) 14)).
190. Id.
191. Community Design Regulation, supra note 189, art. 80.
192. See Judgments of the Community Design Courts, OHIM (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/RCD/caseLaw/judgementsCDCourts.en.do.
193. Aide, supra note 188, at 41.
194. U.S. Caseload Statistics, supra note 171.
195. Id.
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consistency and predictability.196
Assuming that a court’s reversal rate on appeal is probative of its
perceived quality and credibility,197 empirical data indeed corroborates
the virtues of a specialized court. Compared with the U.S. district
courts, whose rulings on patent claims were reversed about forty percent
of the time, the reversal rates for decisions by Community design courts
of first instance were, on average, only seventeen percent for ex parte
decisions and twenty-eight percent for inter partes decisions over the
last five years—a telling statistic that favors the Community design
approach.198 Some might attribute this difference to the intrinsic
differences between patents and designs.199 Yet, court statistics
exclusive to the U.S. patent regime also bolster this conclusion. For
example, after the United States established the CAFC following a
period of fragmented patent rights, the average settlement delay in
patent litigation fell by a statistically significant difference.200 These
numbers strongly indicate the benefits of a specialized court in
providing a predictable legal outcome.
C. A Modified Community Design Approach Would Provide a Viable
Solution in Europe
The September 2011 draft Patent Court agreement and statute, in
conjunction with the current unitary patent Regulation, essentially
elected the Community design approach over the U.S. model, most

196. See id.
197. Holderman & Guren, supra note 165, at 102.
198. See Statistics, Office for Harmonization in the Internet Mkt. (last visited Dec. 7, 2011),
http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/OHIM/statistics.en.do (reporting reversal rates of first
instance decisions over the years 2007–2011 as follows: 13.7%, 15.7%, 16.1%, 19.8%, and
17.9% for ex parte decisions, respectively, and 26.5%, 28.6%, 30.2%, 28.9%, and 26.1%, for
inter partes decisions, respectively).
199. See Winfried Tilmann, Moving Towards Completing the European Patent System –
Overview over the Draft Agreement on a European and EU Patent Court (EEUPC), 4–5 (Sept.
23,
2011),
available
at
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/2011/September/EU%20Patent%20System%20WarsawSpeech
9.9.pdf.
200. See, e.g., Holderman, supra note 165, at 105–06 (describing how judges trained as
generalists, who lack a technical background, are often drawn to the wrong conclusion in patent
cases); Galasso, supra note 163, at 19 (notably, this increased certainty was found, in no small
part, to be attributable to a pro-patent bias on the part of the CAFC); See also Cliston Brown,
Federal Circuit Tackles Increasingly Complicated Case Load, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, 28 (Oct. 28,
2000), at 28 (commenting that the CAFC has evolved from being mostly concerned with
personnel issues to one dominated by highly technical patent cases).

82

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:55

significantly in the structure of its courts of first instance.201 For
example, like the Community design courts, the proposed Patent Court
would be common to the Contracting Member States, yet it would be
treated vis-à-vis the ECJ as a national court for which the member states
are responsible.202 Also similar to Community design courts, the
proposed Patent Courts would be specialized in matters of patent law
and be composed of judges who are both legally and technically
qualified.203
The proposed Patent Court framework raises a jurisdictional issue
reminiscent of Roche and GAT.204 The new Patent Court would deviate
from the Brussels I Regulation’s basic principle that jurisdiction is to be
exercised by the EU country in which the defendant is domiciled,
regardless of nationality.205 The new Patent Court, which has a legal
personality distinct from the national courts, should be harmonized with
this principle.206 This issue could be resolved by naming the new Patent
Court in the Brussels I Regulation as the national court of each state
participating in the Patent Court Agreement.207
There are other important structural differences, setting the
proposed Patent Court apart from either of the aforementioned judicial
systems.208 One major difference relates to the competence and role of
the ECJ in the work of the specialized court.209 For example, the
decisions of Community design courts can be brought before the ECJ
201. See Tilmann, supra note 199, at 1.
202. Id.
203. November 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 153, at 12. Art. 10, for instance, requires
that the Court comprise both legally qualified judges and technically qualified judges, where
technically qualified judges shall have a university degree and proven expertise in a field of
technology, along with proven knowledge of civil law and procedure. Id.
204. See supra Part II.
205. Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC). 205. See also Tilmann,
supra note 199.
206. Tilmann, supra note 199, at 2.
207. Id.
208. Id. The controversial involvement of the ECJ in the Patent Court results from
harmonizing the EPC with the EU treaties. Here, the drafters of the Unitary Patent Regulation
deemed it necessary to provide for sanctions in the Regulation, thus making at least some
substantive patent law part of EU law. This, in turn, allows the Regulation to make use of Article
118 TFEU, which provides a legal basis for “measures for the creation of European intellectual
property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights.” Failure to include a
sanction in the Regulation would risk a ruling by the ECJ that the Regulation is invalid because of
improper application of Article 118.
209. Id. at 4.
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following a decision by the Board of Appeal, with the ECJ having full
jurisdiction “to annul or alter the contested decision.”210 On the other
hand, the competence of the ECJ would be uniquely tailored under the
proposed Patent Court system, since the Patent Court would be
adjudicating rules under the EPC to which the ECJ does not adhere,
including questions of patentability and revocation.211 The ECJ would,
however, be competent to rule on matters of injunctions and limitations
thereof as contained in Article 3(2) of the proposed unitary patent
Regulation.212 While there has been vociferous debate over the extent of
ECJ involvement, particularly as to Articles 6 through 8 of the proposed
Regulation, the ECJ would, in theory, play a fairly limited role in
adjudicating technical matters in patent law, with the brunt of the work
being borne by the Patent Court.213
Based on the latest draft of the Patent Court agreement, the Patent
Court would also differ from U.S. courts and Community design courts
in its unique multinational court composition.214 Under the agreement, a
local division panel would include at least one permanent legally
qualified judge who is a national of the contracting member state
hosting the local division, and at least one judge from an international
“pool” of judges.215 Article 5 further promotes the internationality of the
court—for a local division to be set up in a member state, over one
hundred patent cases per year must be commenced in that member state
in three successive years prior to or subsequent to the date of entry into
force.216 If individual member states cannot meet this condition, the
agreement provides for regional divisions, which also have
multinational composition and are shared by two or more member
states.217 The international character of the Patent Court is significant
because judges can benefit from cross-border interaction between
210. Community Design Regulation, supra note 188, art. 61.
211. Tilmann, supra note 199, at 4.
212. Draft Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 123, at 15. Article 3(2) provides: “A
European patent with unitary effect shall have a unitary character. It shall provide uniform
protection and shall have equal effect in all participating Member States...” Without prejudice to
Article 5, a European patent with unitary effect may only be limited, licensed, transferred,
revoked or lapse in respect of all the participating Member States. Id.
213. Tilmann, supra note 199, at 4; see also Annsley Merelle Ward, Are EU
Ministers Driving US Towards A European Patent Disaster? IPKAT (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2011/12/good-morning-from-amerikat-monday-is.html.
214. November 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 153, art. 6.
215. Id.
216. Id. art 5.
217. Id.
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similarly situated professionals, judges, administrators, and lawyers.218
Such conversations, in turn, can lead to “soft” harmonization, inculcated
by the socially driven convergence of ideas instead of being imposed by
the rule of law.219
Indeed, the greatest problem faced by the unitary patent may not
be legal, but, rather, practical in nature. For the unitary patent to be
considered a long-term success, it must attract the interest of patent
proprietors who might otherwise be reasonably happy with the status
quo.220 There are palpable reasons for why a proprietor would be
reluctant to embrace the unitary patent. Change begets uncertainty, and
the specter of a Community-wide revocation by a rogue court in a
distant member state could give pause to those considering sweeping
changes to their intellectual property policy.221 Patent enforcement is
also rife with language issues, including questions of the operational
language of the division, proceedings, court documents and
judgments.222 Some member states have raised legitimate concerns that
their nationals may not be able to use their own language in the
proposed Patent Court, or that judgments may not be available in their
native language.223 Finally, the costs related to the complex language
requirements and operations of the Patent Court are also largely
uncertain.224 With these risks, even diversified multinational companies
may adopt a “wait and see” approach before including unitary patents in
their portfolios.
For all of these reasons, it is of paramount importance that the
unitary patent is of utmost quality. The need to empower the EPO and
the proposed Patent Court to provide adequate quality control for the
unitary patent cannot be understated because its success ultimately rests
on a cost-benefit calculation by those seeking patent protection.225 In
218. Dinwoodie, supra note 56, at 798.
219. Id.
220. See Herbert Smith, ECJ Rejects the Latest Pan-European Patent Litigation Proposals,
but the Council Authorizes Use of the Cooperation of a Community Patent, HERBERT SMITH LLP
(Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/A9A22D33-5ABB-4D6F-B48B03856E147156/0/020110310ECJrejectslatestUPLSSebastianMooreandRachelMontagnon.html.
221. See Aziz, supra note 112.
222. European Scrutiny Comm., Draft Agreement on a Unified Patent Court and Draft
Statute,
§
2.1
(Dec.
20,
2011),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xlv/42804.htm.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Cf. Mark Shiqian Zhai, The Chinese Utility Model Patent is Destroying Innovation in
China, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 413, 427 (2011) (while the cited cost-benefit analysis relates to utility
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this analysis, patent-seekers weigh the unitary patent against its
alternatives, including the currently existing European and National
patents.226 The patent-seeker balances the costs of obtaining a patent
with later-arising transaction costs, including: (1) uncertainties in patent
protection, (2) litigation inefficiency, and (3) licensing transaction
costs.227 As will be shown, these costs are directly or indirectly
dependent on the quality of the patents granted and the quality of their
enforcement.
First, some patent protection transaction costs derive from the risk
of the EPO granting an overbroad patent claim or the Patent Court
making inconsistent rulings. In this respect, the proposed unitary patent
is primed for success. The EPO is the logical choice to administer the
unitary patent, given its successful track record, dating back to 1973, as
the granting authority for European patents under the EPC.228 The
proposed Regulation wisely leverages existing infrastructure for patent
prosecution, while preserving post-grant EPO procedures such as
limitation, revocation, and opposition proceedings, with appeals going
to the Boards of Appeal.229 As to enforcement, the Patent Court, with its
patent-specialized judges, should be well situated to provide increased
certainty in claim construction and enhance public confidence in the
unitary patent.230 There will be, no doubt, some degree of uncertainty
during an adjustment period establishing any new court system. Costs
associated thereof will offset, to some degree, the benefits of the Patent
Court, but these are short-term issues that will dissipate over time.
Second, the EPO/Patent Court plays a role in maintaining litigation
efficiency.231 It is not surprising that litigation efficiency directly
correlates with legal certainty, since certainty over patent validity and
claim scope facilitates negotiation between litigants, settlement of

models, a similar analysis would apply to patents).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Straus, supra note 23, at 10.
229. Unitary patent/EU patent, supra note 113.
230. November 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 153, at 3.
231. Annsley Merelle Ward, RECAP & UPDATE: the Unitary Patent System and Unified
Patent Court, THE IPKAT (Dec. 20, 2011), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2011/12/recap-updateunitary-patent-system-and.html (arguing for a minimal role of the ECJ in the Patent Court under
the premise that the consequential delays, uncertainty and substantive patent law being interpreted
by an unspecialized judiciary would defeat the system that the unitary patent system was intended
to create).
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certain issues, and appropriate tailoring of other issues.232 Accordingly,
high-quality examinations of patent claims, both by the EPO and the
Patent Court, are essential to providing a strong presumption of patent
validity and minimizing litigation over questionable patent claims.233
Reducing litigation time, in turn, will decrease transaction costs
between negotiating parties in patent infringement disputes.234
Finally, transaction costs take the form of clearance costs imposed
on commercial activity. A company planning to do business in a given
member state will need to conduct a thorough search of applicable,
granted European and unitary patents in case licenses are required to
practice its business.235 Questionable patent rights cannot be easily
valued and they erode efficiency of the market for licensing patents,
eventually impacting the cross-fertilization of technology between small
and medium-sized entities that specialize in radical innovation, and
large companies that develop, produce, and market those innovations.236
As before, a specialized Patent Court is more likely to arrive at
consistent outcomes from one member state to another than a nonspecialized court.
Transactional costs must therefore be kept under control to provide
an affordable system and encourage widespread acceptance of the
unitary patent by multinational companies, as well as small and
medium-sized entities.237 Acceptance of the unitary patent by patent
proprietors will generate fee revenue, thereby defraying the incremental
costs incurred by the EPO in processing unitary patent applications,
collecting renewal fees, maintaining a registry, and managing the
compensation system for translation costs.238 Just as importantly,
232. See Zhai, supra note 225, at 427.
233. Id. at 428.
234. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 163, at 1.
235. Zhai, supra note 225, at 428.
236. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 163, at 1 (describing the importance of patent
transactions in high technology areas).
237. See Straus, supra note 23.
238. Benoît Battistelli, Address at the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs
Hearing: On the Threshold of Unitary Patent Protection in Europe (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.epo.org/news-issues/press/speeches/20111011.html. [hereinafter Battistelli Address].
While translation costs may be considerable in the short term, Article 6 of the proposed Unitary
Patent Regulation provides for transitional measures to be applied during a certain period, before
a system of high quality machine translations into all official languages of the Union becomes
available. Recently, the EPO has reported progress on a machine translation program that is
expected, by 2014, to provide translations from English, French and German into 28 European
languages plus Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Russian. Technology could thus drive down
translation costs significantly over time.
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successful outcomes will encourage the future participation of member
states not initially part of the unitary patent project.239
V. THE PROPOSED PATENT COURT AGREEMENT HARMONIZES THE EPC
AND EU LAW, BUT ITS LONG-TERM SUCCESS REQUIRES TRUST BETWEEN
THE PATENT COURT AND THE ECJ
Opponents of the unitary patent project have seized on the ECJ
ruling to urge that the unitary patent should not involve the EPO and
instead be fully administered within EU institutions.240 An opposite tack
was taken by proponents of the unitary patent, who have argued that the
Regulation should be re-crafted to curtail ECJ involvement in
substantive matters of the Patent Court.241 This Note advances the
opinion that both of these viewpoints are mistaken, and the proposed
unitary patent Regulation and Patent Court agreement are in full
compliance with EU law.
A. The Lisbon Treaty Contemplates Administration and Enforcement of
the Unitary Patent by Non-EU Institutions
One vocal critic of the proposed Regulation and Patent Court
agreement is April, a French advocacy association devoted to promoting
a democratic innovation policy in Europe.242 April argues that the March
2011 ECJ opinion plainly demonstrates that (1) patent-related litigation
must be dealt with by national courts in each member state, and (2) the
primacy of EU law is incompatible with non-EU institutions ruling on
matters that affect the fundamental rights of European citizens.243 Each
of these points will be examined in turn.
The first issue is jurisdictional. In the ECJ opinion, the court held
that “since that jurisdiction [to rule on direct actions between
individuals in the field of patents] is held by the courts of the Member
States . . . . the Member States cannot confer the jurisdiction to resolve
such disputes on a court created by an international agreement.”244
239. Battistelli Address, supra note 238.
240. Jeanne Tadeusz, Analysis of the Opinion From the European Court of Justice on the
Unified Patent Court (Mar. 11, 2011, 12:33 PM), http://www.april.org/en/print/14866.
241. See Ward, supra note 213.
242. See Introducing April, APRIL (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.april.org/en/introducing-april.
243. Tadeusz, supra note 240.
244. Case C-1/09, Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, 2011 E.C.R. I-1, I-18
[hereinafter March 2011 ECJ Opinion], available at http://www.ipeg.eu/wpcontent/uploads/Opinion-of-the-European-Court-of-Justice-on-EU-Patent-March-8-
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Since this reasoning was based on Article 267 of the Lisbon Treaty,
concerning preliminary rulings by the ECJ, the question of jurisdiction
turns on whether the courts in the current Patent Court agreement
constitute courts “of the Member States” according to the purview of
Article 267.245 The following two cases illuminate this issue.
In Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora, decided in 1997, Parfums
Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV (collectively, “Dior”)
filed an infringement action against Evora BV (“Evora”) in a district
court of the Netherlands for using Dior’s trademarks to market perfume
products.246 While the district court granted Dior’s application, Evora
appealed to the Regional Court in Amsterdam, which reversed.247 After
another appeal, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands stayed the
proceedings and requested clarification from the ECJ as to what
constitutes a “court or tribunal of the Member State against whose
decisions there is no remedy under national law,” under Article 177 of
the EC Treaty (the predecessor to Article 267 TFEU).248 Citing the
establishment of the tri-national Benelux Court of Justice in 1975, the
ECJ held that “[t]here is no good reason why such a court, common to a
number of Member States, should not be able to submit questions to this
Court, in the same way as courts or tribunals of any of those Member
States.”249 According to the ECJ, “[t]o allow a court . . . faced with the
task of interpreting Community rules in the performance of its function,
to follow the procedure provided for by Article 177 of the Treaty would
therefore serve the purpose of that provision, which is to ensure the
uniform interpretation of Community law.”250
This ruling was recently qualified by a 2011 case, Miles v.
2011_C1_09EN.pdf.
245. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 267.
246. Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior v. Evora, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, I-6036–38,
available
at
http://0www.heinonline.org.lucy.lls.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.intyb/rcbjcofi0082&id=9&collection=i
ntyb&index=intyb/rcbjcofi.
247. Id. at I-6038.
248. Id. at I-6039–40; see also Treaty of Rome, supra note 20, art. 177; TFEU, supra note 22,
art. 267.
249. Id. ¶ 21 (the Benelux Court is an instrument of the Benelux Economic Union created by
the Benelux Treaty of 1958 to foster economic cooperation between Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands. The Benelux Court helps promote uniformity in the application of rules of law
common to Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands by way of preliminary ruling, and has
jurisdiction in administrative cases. See Benelux CJ – Court Of Justice of the Benelux Economic
Union, PICT-PCTI (last visited Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/beneluxCJ.html).
250. Id. ¶ 23.
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European Schools, in which a group of teachers filed suit against the
European schools because the schools refused to adjust their
remuneration following depreciation of the pound sterling against other
currencies.251 The European Schools’ Convention, upon which the
schools were based, provided a Complaints Board (“Board”) with “sole
jurisdiction in the first and final instance . . . in any dispute concerning
the application of this Convention to all persons covered by it with the
exception of administrative and ancillary staff, and regarding the
legality of any act based on the Convention or rules made under it.”252
The Board stayed the proceedings and referred a threshold question to
the ECJ: Is the Board, being common to the member states but not
falling directly within the authority of any particular member state,
competent to refer questions to the ECJ?253 The ECJ answered in the
negative, ruling that while the Board was a “court or tribunal” within
the meaning of Article 267, it does not have judicial links with the
judicial systems of the member states and thus should not be able to
submit questions to the Court of Justice.254
Here, the proposed Patent Court agreement provides for a court
system with jurisdiction over all contracting member states of the
agreement in matters concerning unitary patents.255 As indicated in the
draft agreement, the Patent Court should be considered competent to ask
preliminary questions on the basis of Article 267 TFEU now that (1)
non-EU member states have been removed from the agreement and (2)
the Patent Court is common only to the member states of the
agreement.256 Like the Benelux Court in Dior, the Patent Court is
“common to a number of member states,” and thus should be competent
to refer questions to the ECJ “in the same way as courts or tribunals of
those member states.”257
Under the latest revision of the proposed Patent Court agreement,
the Patent Court also should not be restricted under the purview of the
Miles case, because the Patent Court has at least one judicial link with
the national courts under the proposed Patent Court agreement.258 For
251. See Case C-196/09, Paul Miles v. European Schools, 2011 E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 2, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0196:EN:HTML.
252. Id. ¶ 8.
253. Id. ¶ 30–31.
254. Id. ¶ 41.
255. See November 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 153, at 4.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 5.
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example, Article 14c of the draft agreement expressly provides that
“Contracting Member States are jointly and severally liable for damages
. . . resulting from an infringement of Union law by the Court of
Appeal,” and that “[a]ny action seeking compensation for such damage
shall be brought against the Contracting Member State where the
claimant is domiciled before the competent court of that Contracting
State (emphasis added).”259 Since the national courts of the contracting
member states would decide issues of infringement of Union law by the
Patent Court, the Patent Court should be competent under Article 267 to
refer questions to the ECJ.260
The second question concerns the involvement of the EPO, a nonEU institution, in administering the unitary patent. Critics such as April
have characterized the EPO as an unchecked, “anti-democratic”
institution whose proposed role would be contrary to EU law.261 These
objections are without merit. Whether the EPO can administer the
unitary patent is a legal question that essentially rests on the compliance
of the unitary patent Regulation with Article 118 of the Lisbon
Treaty.262 Article 97a states the following:
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal
market, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish
measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to
provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout
the Union and for the setting up of centralised [sic] Union-wide
263
authorisation [sic], coordination and supervision arrangements.

On its face, there is nothing in the above text that limits the
“creation of the European intellectual property rights” to EU
institutions. Moreover, no such limitation can be implied based on the
intent of the framers of the Lisbon Treaty, because the framers would
have had full knowledge of the EPC and the central role of the EPO
since the signing of the European Patent Convention in 1973.264 The
negative opinion of the Legal Service of the European Parliament
259. Id. art. 14(c). Article 14(c) further provides that where the claimant is not domiciled in a
Contracting Member State, it may bring such an action against the Contracting Member State
where the Court of Appeal has its seat, before the competent court of that Contracting Member
State. Id.
260. Id. at 5.
261. Tadeusz, supra note 240.
262. See Tilmann, supra note 199, at 3.
263. See TFEU, supra note 22, at 71.
264. See supra II; Tilmann, supra note 199, at 4.
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concerning the EPLA is no longer a basis for rejecting the Regulation,
since Article 118 is an exception to Article 344, confining
“interpretation or application of the Treaties” to the “ordinary” courts
within the EU legal order.265 In brief, the contention that the EPO role in
the proposed Patent Court is incompatible with EU law merely because
it is a non-EU institution is highly doubtful.
B. The Exclusion of the ECJ in Matters of Substantive
Patent Law is Not Viable
Even some proponents of the Patent Court voiced opposition to the
draft agreement, arguing that the Patent Court should have the final say
in patent matters. A unanimous resolution of the Intellectual Property
Judges Association stated that Articles 6 through 8, concerning matters
of direct infringement, indirect infringement, and limitations thereof,
should be jettisoned from the Regulation to exclude the ECJ from
adjudication of substantive patent law.266 According to the resolution,
their inclusion would result in the new system failing to realize the goal
of a better patent litigation system in Europe.267 Professor Robin Jacob,
who is of this view, commented that inclusion of Articles 6 through 8 in
the Regulation would be “disastrous,” with the non-specialized ECJ
upsetting the judicial process, causing delays, and promoting
uncertainty.268
Despite some impassioned protests against ECJ inclusion,269
wholesale exclusion of the ECJ role in the unitary patent project is
unlikely to occur, for two reasons: (1) the Lisbon Treaty provision
contemplates an active EU role in “uniform protection of intellectual
property rights,” and (2) the ECJ is unlikely to concede competence
since it has already held elements of patent law to be part of the EU
legal order.
First, Article 118 of the Lisbon Treaty appears to explicitly
mandate involvement of EU institutions in substantive patent law by
setting out that any unitary patent Regulation should “establish
265. See TFEU, supra note 22, arts. 118, 344.
266. See Draft Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 123, arts. 6–8; Robin Jacob, President
of the Intellectual Prop. Judges Ass’n, Letter of Resolution (Nov. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/2011/November/Venice%2020Judges%2020Resolution%2020
2011%5B1%5D.pdf.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Ward, supra note 213.
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measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to
provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the
Union.”270 In one construction, Article 118 can only be used as a legal
basis for the unitary patent Regulation if the Regulation contains
provisions for “uniform protection” of intellectual property rights.271
Read more expansively, the Article merely requires that the proposed
Regulation create a basis of a unitary right, without mandating that EU
law govern this right.272 As between these two constructions, only the
former is plausible. The signing parties to the Lisbon Treaty, keenly
aware of the multinational enforcement problem of the GAT and Roche
cases earlier discussed, would have objectively understood Article 118
to be calling for an active EU role in establishing “uniform
protection.”273 This is further supported by the official EU press release
accompanying the Lisbon Treaty, stating that “if the EU legislator
decides to make use of [Article 118], it could allow overcoming the
present fragmentation of the EU in twenty-seven national copyright
regimes (emphasis added),”274 as well as the existence of Community
design courts created under Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002.
Second, the ECJ has previously suggested that substantive patent
law is part of EU law, and hence part of its jurisdiction. In its March
2011 opinion, for example, the ECJ declared that the creation of the
Patent Court would deprive national courts and tribunals of the power,
or obligation, to refer questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling in
the field of patents.275 Implicit in this language is the assumption that
patent law should be integrated with EU law to allow referrals to
operate within the EU judicial framework.276 Such an assumption is also
consistent with the involvement of the ECJ in intellectual property
matters today.277
270. See TFEU, supra note 22, art. 118.
271. Tilmann, supra note 199, at 4.
272. See Opinion of Rt. Hon. Professor Sir Robin Jacob (Nov. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/2011/November/Robin%2020Jacob%2020Opinion%2020re%2
020Arts.pdf.
273. See Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and
the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 827 (2007) (arguing that the intent of the
foreign parties assenting to a treaty should govern interpretation of its terms).
274. Press Release, Eur. Union, Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon (Dec. 1, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/531.
275. See March 2011 ECJ Opinion, supra note 244.
276. See Bender, supra note 24, at 3.
277. The ECJ has recently adjudicated both patent and community design matters. See, e.g.,
Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), ¶ 119 (Oct.
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The ability, and obligation, of the Patent Court to refer questions to
the ECJ for preliminary rulings in matters of infringement potentially
adds uncertainty to the unitary patent system. In the long term, however,
substantial benefits may arise from a counterbalance to the power of the
Patent Court of Appeal. Once again, the CAFC provides a case in point.
Since its inception, the CAFC has generally expanded patent-eligible
subject matter and strengthened patent rights, developing a reputation as
a pro-patent court.278 The same may occur in Europe. The danger is that
a specialized court runs the risk of being myopic; by focusing on highly
technical patent cases day in and day out, it may not appreciate the full
breadth of nuanced policy interests as well as a court of more general
jurisdiction. These reasons may help explain the U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent willingness to intervene in patent law cases.279 Thus, provided
that the ECJ restrains itself, it can provide a valuable check on the
Patent Court by clarifying matters of interpretation that could have
adverse ancillary effects on the functioning of the EU.
Notable European judges and patent practitioners have also
lambasted the prospect of ECJ involvement that could result in a
massively inefficient, unpredictable and expensive court system, calling
the package, as a whole, “worse than the system it is meant to

18,
2011),
available
at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=81836&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&cid=620544 (ruling that an invention will not be patentable if the
subject matter of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their
use as a base material); C-281/10P, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grupo Promer Mon Graphic SA, 2011
E.C.R.
¶
53,
available
at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0281:EN:NOT (where the ECJ
defined an “informed user” as referring not to a user of average attention, but to a particularly
observant one, based on personal experience or extensive knowledge of the sector in question).
278. See, e.g., Mireles, supra note 98, at 718 (noting that whereas the circuit courts had
affirmed sixty-two percent of district-court findings of patent infringement in the three decades
before the creation of the CAFC, the CAFC in its first eight years affirmed 90 percent of such
decisions. On the other hand, when the district court had found that a patent was invalid or not
infringed—thereby denying the patentee enforcement of the patent—the circuits had reversed
only 12 percent of the cases. In the first eight years of the Federal Circuit, 28 percent of these
cases were reversed.); Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of a
Centralized Judiciary, Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON.
441 (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary].
279. As a fairly recent U.S. example, consider eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, in which the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the CAFC, holding that an injunction should not automatically issue
based on a finding of patent infringement, but also that an injunction should not be denied simply
on the basis that the plaintiff does not practice the patented invention. eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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improve.”280 This fatalistic and false choice between achieving the goals
of the unitary patent project and acceding to ECJ jurisdiction should be
rejected. First, this view discounts any possibility of procedural solution
to the aforementioned inefficiencies. The Patent Court agreement itself
sets out rules of procedure adopted by the Administrative Committee
that “shall guarantee that the decisions of the Court are of the highest
quality and that proceedings are organised in the most efficient and cost
effective manner (emphasis added).”281 Such rules could conceivably
inform, for example, how questions are qualified and consolidated and
cabin the scope of referrals to the ECJ. Second, many of the particularly
murky issues raised by the Regulation, such as patent assignments,
voluntary and compulsory licenses, and government use, are expressly
reserved as matters of domestic law for the participating member
states,282 and thus are likely to fall outside the purview of the ECJ in
most disputes.283 Lastly, the ECJ does not operate within a vacuum, and
could plausibly adapt to provide a coherent jurisprudence. For example,
comity with the Patent Court could lead the ECJ to undergo reform,284 or
at least temper its judicial activism so as to minimize legal interpretation
conflict.285
While some growing pains are to be expected in any new legal
regime, necessity will drive the convergence of jurisprudence allowing
the Patent Court and ECJ to peacefully co-exist in the enforcement of a
unitary patent. Sharing this responsibility will require mutual trust
280. See Ward, supra note 213 (quoting Dr. Jochen Pagenberg, past president of the
European Patent Lawyers Association).
281. November 2011 Draft Agreement, supra note 153, art. 22.
282. See Draft Unitary Patent Regulation, supra note 123, at 9, 21 (wherein Article 10
declares national law to be generally applicable to the Unitary Patent as an object of property, and
recital 9a expressly states that compulsory licenses will be governed by the “national legislation .
. . of the member states”).
283. See, e.g., Case 244/80, Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello, 1981 E.C.R. 3045, ¶ 18 (the
Court declining jurisdiction where there was an absence of a genuine dispute).
284. As one example, the ECJ is authorized to establish specialist judicial chambers to hear
certain categories of appeal. See Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Mar. 10, 2001, 2001
O.J.
(C
80)
25–26,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf (conceivably, a chamber having a
suitably appointed composition could facilitate hearings on patent matters).
285. See Axel H. Horns, BREAKING: Agreement on EU Unitary Patent Reached, K/S/N/H:
LAW BLOG (June 29, 2012), http://blog.ksnh.eu/en/2012/06/29/breaking-agreement-on-euunitary-patent-reached.; Ullrich, supra note 120, at 54 (on the asymmetric distribution of
jurisprudence between the ECJ and the new Patent Court with respect to the conventional
European Patent presently granted under the EPC and the Unitary Patent).
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between the two judicial institutions. On one hand, the ECJ must trust
that the Patent Court does not allow questionable patents and associated
litigation to proliferate.286 On the other hand, the Patent Court must trust
the ECJ to tread lightly, especially concerning matters fundamental to
patent law.287 It is insightful that the U.S. Supreme Court has largely
avoided interference with the CAFC over its first 24 years of operation,
thus giving the latter court time to establish its own jurisprudence.288
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent developments on the unitary patent regulation have not
been bereft of drama. At the June 2012 European Council summit,
unitary patent proponents triumphantly eliminated a major stumbling
block only to resurrect yet another controversy.289 Both the European
Council and the EPO ebulliently reported that negotiations at the
summit had produced a “historic breakthrough.”290 In spite of the
pending legal challenges filed by Spain and Italy291 and much internal
squabbling over the location of the Central Division of the Unified
Patent Court,292 negotiating member states (minus Spain and Italy)
finally came to a compromise—Paris would be the seat of the Court’s
central division and specialized clusters would be established in Munich
and London.293 But with so-called “eurosceptics” and industry advocates
leading the charge, the Council also issued in their Conclusions what is
likely to be construed as a provocative declaration of mistrust of the
ECJ: “We suggest that Articles 6 to 8 of the Regulation implementing
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent
286. See Steve Seidenberg, The Big Patent Year Pending: This Term the Supreme Court May
Make Some Big Changes in Patent Law, 92 A.B.A. J. 14 (2006) [hereinafter The Big Patent Year
Pending].
287. See id. (on the U.S. Supreme Court history of intervention with the Federal Circuit).
288. Id.; see also Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale
Bar, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
1151, 1208 (1993).
289. See Brussels European Council, June 28/29, 2012, General Secretariat Conclusions,
EUCO 76/12 (June 29, 2012); see also Horns, supra note 285. The controversy over removal of
Articles 6 to 8 from the Regulation certainly appears destined for a showdown at the ECJ.
290. EPO Welcomes Historic Breakthrough on the Unitary Patent, EUR. PAT. OFF. (June 29,
2012), http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2012/20120629.html; EU Unitary Patent – A
Historic Breakthrough, EUR. COUNCIL (June 29, 2012), http://www.europeancouncil.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/eu-unitary-patent-%E2%80%93-a-historicalbreakthrough?lang=en.
291. See Italy and Spain Block EU-wide Patent Talks, supra note 129.
292. See Horns, supra note 285.
293. See Brussels European Council, supra note 289.
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protection . . . be deleted.”294 With the Patent Court agreement still
being negotiated by a sub-committee of the European Parliament mostly
behind closed doors,295 legal wrangling over the Council’s
recommendation will continue apace.
Notwithstanding the fate of Articles 6 through 8 in the current
Regulation, European patent reform is imperative and the consequences
of inaction loom large. The current economic crisis plaguing the
fragmented European community underscores the need for a unitary
patent and an integrated patent court to encourage innovation and
investment, promote the free movement of goods and services
throughout the internal market, and reduce litigation costs. Yet, in spite
of the momentum generated by successful pan-European integration of
intellectual property rights in the areas of plant varieties, trademarks,
and most recently, designs, a battery of legal issues borne from
incompatible existing European treaties has confounded the creation of
a unitary patent system.
Proposals for a unitary patent system can be informed by presentday implementations of unitary intellectual property rights, including
the U.S. federal court and Community design court regimes. The
specialized Community design approach is preferred over that of the
United States because it enables higher rates of precedential formation,
leading to greater legal certainty. This, in turn, faciliates transactions
associated with patent protection, encourages participation in the unitary
patent system and ultimately lowers costs. The latest drafts of the
unitary patent Regulation and Patent Court agreement and statute would
substantially achieve the benefits of the Community design approach,
while judiciously limiting participation in the agreement and
strengthening the Patent Court’s obligations to comply with EU law.
Finally, calls to implement the unitary patent entirely within EU
institutions and for exclusion of the ECJ from its enforcement are
unfounded. The Lisbon Treaty provides an implied legal basis for the
involvement of non-EU institutions such as the EPO, whose
involvement would be necessary as a practical matter in administering a
high quality unitary patent. Any Patent Court that excludes an ECJ role
is unlikely to pass muster under EU law. Moreover, the U.S. court
model suggests that a specialized patent court that is checked by a
294. Id.
295. See Horns, supra note 285 (reporting on the back room negotiations with the European
Council by the JURI Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament concerning the
agreement on the Unitary Patent and the related language regime).
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generalist court can indeed flourish if given sufficient time and latitude
to establish its jurisprudence. For the foregoing reasons, the latest draft
of the Patent Court agreement and unitary patent Regulation may well
have finally converged on a practicable approach that will propel the
long awaited breakthrough Europe has sought for the better part of the
last forty years.

